Replacing the Afghanistan Lightning Rod
It is hard to easily discuss sacrifice, loss, worth, and purpose, especially in current times when all of these issues feel so raw. I wrote this piece to reconcile my own emotions and to put into context experiences that shaped my life. It is challenging to express this all in 1000 words. I hope, as a reader, that you can forgive and still discuss parts with which you may disagree.
We put a lightning rod in Afghanistan, and for twenty years, it created a costly but localised storm. We may look back, though, and think that it was a period of relative peace and calm.
In 2001, less than 30 days after 9/11, the US military and allies attacked Afghanistan in Operation Enduring Freedom. The subsequent conflict is well documented and hotly debated with the recent withdrawal and Taliban seizure of power.
Afghanistan faces an uncertain and dark future, especially if it returns to the extremist state from before 2001. That return looks highly likely, although not inevitable.
For Afghans, wracked by conflict for decades, it is a return to instability and fear. The period of democracy is over, with Western investment and support for the country abruptly ended.
Right now, there are questions of worth and value for Western armies, who sacrificed their soldiers to maintain that democracy and expenditure. Why did so many soldiers die only to see a return to the same state after 20 years? Why did Western nation-building fail so badly and end in a bitter defeat?
A regional perspective may provide some consolation and, sadly, significant future concerns.
Operation Enduring Freedom was a retaliation to prevent safely harboured Al-Qaeda terrorists from launching similar devasting attacks on the West, especially on US soil and harshly experience on 9/11. The operation achieved this goal, as the US defeated the Taliban state and removed security for Al-Qaeda.
The conflict that followed was bitter, costly, and unforgiving, yet restricted to the fields and mountains of Afghanistan. The US hounded Al-Qaeda across borders, and the Taliban resisted where they could. Islamic extremists congregated and died around the Western lightning rod in Afghanistan. There were significant losses on all sides, yet there was no repeat of 9/11 elsewhere. Extremist attacks took place but without coordination.
The US-led presence also focussed regional attention, creating a focus for nations that restricted their freedom of manoeuvre.
West of Afghanistan, Iran faced a US military presence on both sides, and US aircraft could reach Tehran from East or West. This split threat forced Iran to divert forces from its predominant zone of influence in the Gulf and disperse air defence assets countrywide. In extremes, a US attack into Iran would be slightly easier from Afghanistan, as it would avoid the Zagros Mountains that protect Iran's western flank.
In the south, Pakistan maintained an uneasy relationship with the US government and military. Accused of harbouring Al-Qaeda, military operations from Afghanistan into Pakistan were a constant issue. Most notably, Operation Neptune Spear launched into Pakistan to kill Osama Bin Laden without informing the Pakistan government.
Pakistan balanced between internal extremist support towards the Taliban and maintaining its international reputation and status. With a US presence in Afghanistan, Pakistan found it preferable to maintain its international standing and deter extremists from its soil even if it was not universally popular within Pakistan itself.
Former Russian states of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan flirted briefly with partially increased democracy to the North, yet all remain under robust presidential control. Uzbekistan signed a joint strategic agreement with the US in 2002, although relations cooled after the revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, prompting more substantial Russian influence across its former states.
To the east, 76km of Afghanistan borders China. The corridor is closed into China, with unrest in Xinjiang province on the Chinese side as the reason. China continues to see Islamic unrest in the region and has been unwilling to let that tension flourish.
Iran, Pakistan, Russia, and China had reasons to proceed cautiously with 100,000+ US and Western military in their vicinity. Consequently, the region was relatively stable.
It is already likely that the Afghanistan Taliban engages with all of these nations. The US and former Afghan rulers have consistently accused Iran of supporting the Taliban with intelligence and weapons. Russia's alleged bounty payments for Taliban killing US soldiers was a Presidential Election issue last year, and Pakistan has long been held in suspicion by the US of harbouring Taliban forces along its border. Last week, Tobias Ellwood, UK MP and Chair of the UK Defence Committee, claimed that China was already seeking trade agreements with the new Taliban government.
For each of these countries, there are significant gains with the US withdrawal and change of the Afghan government. Iran can shift West, centring its defences against any threat from the Gulf. The border with India and its internal stability will concentrate the Pakistan government. Russia can emphasise its sphere of influence across its former states without challenge. China can secure its Islamic regions and grow closer to Russia and Iran.
This power shift means that the West also needs to shift its engagement and diplomacy. The Taliban is unlikely to listen long to a US lecture on human rights or a UK diplomatic effort to encourage female education. We need to engage now through those countries with influence.
The new regime will need economic support and allies. It can survive for a while on illegal drug trades and possibly exporting the extensive collection of military equipment claimed from the Afghan military. Still, it will need stability and income to survive.
A delegation from Iran or China will have more influence over the new government, and they are also more interested in broader reciprocal agreements. It may be unpleasant for the West to deal with another country to secure stability, but doing so is in every country's interest, even in Afghanistan.
It's a scant consolation to someone living in fear or someone dealing with a personal loss that they have contributed to reducing global terrorism, that their pain has prevented many others from feeling the same, or that their sacrifice kept a broader peace. It's also stereotyped to suggest that Afghanistan is just a piece of the Great Game between global powers once more.
Yet, for 20 years, there has been a costly balance maintained because of the West's campaigns in Afghanistan. Now, with that presence abruptly ending in a painful downfall, that balance is no longer in place. Western governments have to sacrifice pride to secure future stability for the people in Afghanistan today, paid for by those who died in Afghanistan.
The West needs to recognise its defeat, swallow its pride, engage diplomatically through new partners, and consider whether another twenty years of relative calm is preferable to a future period of uncertainty and conflicts.
