Transformation is Dead. Long Live AI-Powered Transformation

The concept of 'digital transformation' has become diluted. While some industries have been reborn – think finance and technology – others lag, relying on incremental tweaks instead of true disruption. As a leader in defence, I see this firsthand and ask myself, why?

Three Lenses, One Observation

My background offers a unique perspective on this challenge:

• The Professional Services View: As a consultant, I've witnessed the transformative potential of technology firsthand. Global businesses embrace digital tools, reshape their core processes, and emerge as dominant forces in their sectors. In many sectors, a worker from the 1990s would struggle to comprehend their modern-day workplaces. Yet, some sectors – notably those with well-established legacy systems and ingrained practices – seem reluctant to adopt a transformative mindset fully. While incremental change occurs, the fundamental structures and ways of operating remain largely the same.

• The Geek's View: From my early days working with defence AI projects to being part of Microsoft's revitalisation under Satya Nadella, one thing stands out: Transformation without the right mindset and leadership is an uphill battle. Nadella's focus on a growth mindset revolutionised Microsoft. It empowered people, broke down silos, and instilled a culture of relentless innovation across the entire organisation. This kind of top-down commitment is the secret ingredient often missing from today’s transformative efforts.

• The Soldier's View: Since the 1990s, visionaries have painted a compelling picture of future warfare: Digitally enabled, AI-driven, highly networked, fundamentally changing how we operate. Sadly, much of that thinking evolved purely into cyber, then became wrapped into security. The digital promises have not been delivered, even when events like the conflict in Ukraine demonstrate the accuracy of these predictions on a broad scale. Yet the on-the-ground reality within many militaries beyond Ukraine tells a different story. Core doctrines, operational models, and even individual soldier skill sets often have more in common with decades past than they do with the cutting-edge future we envision. This calls into question whether the transformative urgency felt in the tech sector indeed permeates the military the way it needs to. A soldier from the past would likely recognise much of our current operations.

The Old Transformation Model's Achilles Heel

In 2014, forward-thinking defence articles like "Warfare in the Information Age" depicted AI-driven conflict. That vision is now grimly unfolding in Ukraine, underscoring the power of drones, intelligent systems, and network-centric warfare. Yet, within our military organisations, the same transformative fire and burning urgency often seems absent. Could it be that the classic top-down model of cultural transformation isn't the best fit for the military mindset?

The traditional transformation model hinges on sweeping cultural changes led from the top. This approach can be practical but faces challenges within a military environment. It's often slow, and its results can be unpredictable as technology outpaces the speed of cultural adaptation. Military organisations are also traditionally resistant to change with embedded, established cultures.

Meanwhile, the tech sector thrives on a drastically different model. Fuelled by constant competition and the need for relentless innovation, tech leaders evolve at a pace that leaves little room to ponder cultural challenges. Tech companies have short histories and are less inclined to cling to ancient traditions or practices.

“This jarring contrast begs the question: have we fallen behind in the defence sector? Have we clung to a transformation model that may have already reached the limits of its effectiveness?”

It's Time to Deploy AI to Transform, Not the Other Way Around

Here's a radical proposition: use AI as the Transformation Engine. Too often, we envision digital transformation as a cultural prerequisite before deploying new technologies. But what if we flipped the script? AI doesn't just automate tasks; it creates new ways of working, thinking, and collaborating. AI can compensate and adjust for resistance, and by deploying AI tools strategically, we can:

• Simplify Complex Processes: Break down bureaucratic barriers and streamline decision-making with AI-powered recommendations and insights.

• Address Skill Gaps: AI can provide on-the-job training and support, augmenting human capabilities and levelling the playing field.

• Deliver Measurable Results: AI's impact can be quantified, making the benefits of transformation undeniable and building trust in further adoption.

We Have the Tools Today: The AI revolution isn't a distant dream. Across defence, projects are underway that demonstrate the transformative power of AI right now. We see current examples of how AI can deliver transformation, including:

• Air Tasking: AI to help plan and execute air control and dominance, accelerating and amplifying air power.

• Enhanced Intelligence Analysis: AI helps sift through massive data sets, uncovering patterns and improving situational awareness.

• Cybersecurity Optimisation: AI detects anomalies and prioritises threats, strengthening our digital defences.

The key is empowering people and teams with AI tools. It's about demonstrating tangible value, not waiting for some abstract cultural shift to occur magically. Some may complain that we should not use AI to change behaviours or cultures. Yet, it merely accelerates the change that all would agree needs to happen within our military organisations.

The Choice We Face

• Path One: Stagnation – We cling to incremental improvements, hoping that a cultural breakthrough will magically appear someday.

• Path Two: Revolution – We acknowledge that the traditional transformation model might be obsolete. But instead of despair, we see this as an opportunity. AI empowers a new kind of transformation – driven from the bottom up, results-oriented, and fuelled by the urgency of the present.

We have the expertise, and the technology is here. Are we prepared to shed outdated paradigms and embrace a future-proof military force powered by intelligent transformation?

How to think about military AI, not what to think.

Midjourney prompt: How to think about military AI

I'm an evangelist, someone who passionately believes that they have seen the future. My future belief is that artificial intelligence, automation, machine learning presents an opportunity to enhance human ingenuity far beyond any previous technology.

It also has the potential to cause great harm.

I am sometimes accused as someone who thinks differently, and I am not always sure that is meant as a compliment. Yet it is in this perspective, of a society grappling with major changes and upheaval through automation, that I urge military leaders to consider HOW they think about AI, and to move away from a narrative that is mostly focussed, if at all, on WHAT to think.

What do I mean by this difference? When the US and UK adopted a doctrinal approach to warfare in the 1980s, they adopted an approach that enables soldiers to think about their situations and decisions rather than follow a simple drill or routine. This change was resisted by generations of military officers, shaped by deterring Soviet aggression in Europe, more used to prepared positions with a sequence of triggers and responses than independent action. I experienced this resistance.

We began to encourage leaders to learn how to think about any problem rather than what answer to provide to a specific problem.

Yet technology adoption has been blighted by a preference to deconstruct innovative technology rather than understand the opportunity, especially in the UK.

The impact of the machine gun in 1914 led to the creation of The Machine Gun Corps in 1915. Their role was to understand the technical aspect of machine guns and to deploy them more effectively. Eventually, in 1922, The Machine Gun Corps was disbanded, and its role and purpose embedded intrinsically into infantry brigades. We took seven years to truly integrate this essential weapon.

The pattern was repeated with the tank, where the Heavy Machine Gun Corps owned the technical adoption and maintenance of the tank as mobile machine gun posts. Thinking on how to deploy tanks came later. It is probable that the decision to limit Germany's physical access to armoured vehicles accelerated its thinking on how to deploy tanks in new ways rather than languish in admiring their mechanics.

In both cases, the emphasis was on a specialist group understanding a specialist equipment and eventually implementing that equipment on the battlefield. We deconstructed the system, understood it at a systems level, and eventually became comfortable with the technology over many years before integration.

We are too often continuing this archaic approach with automation and AI. The utility of AI is explored by specialist units and procurement parts of defence, usually innovation or experiment teams, and is seldom experienced by or involves troops struggling with genuine issues. Bolder military elements are attempting to get AI into the hands of users, but their foresight is often hindered by both access to soldiers and support for development.

Like drones and cyber before, the opportunities to explore and experience automation on a general military exercise are few. Automation exercises are designed, established, and run purely to explore the AI system rather than examine its integration and exploitation with other military systems. Large military exercises are conducted without any automation.

This training focus may mean that large troop movements can be conducted smoothly across exercise plains and areas. These exercises may validate that current equipment continues to operate as expected, or that commanders are able to deploy tactical manoeuvres. It avoids training exercise serials and schedules being disrupted by automation.

Yet current exercises are not preparing the next generation of leaders for warfare in the intelligent age.

Leaders and those led, at every level, need to see what is possible with automation and to explore and exceed its limitations. It is only by using an equipment that empowers soldiers to learn about its true utility, and it is only through experience with innovative technologies that their disruptive nature can be explored or developed. Technology elements may not be ready for full deployment, but if commanders are not thinking about how they could use AI, even if theoretically, they will miss the opportunity to shape how they will use AI.

Our soldiers are often disruptive, and military leaders need to fire their enthusiasm for how AI will disrupt their core business.

Today, it is often too easy for a military leader to deny that they have technological understanding unless they are in a technical branch. There remains a certain badge of honour to declare that they know nothing of mobile phones, or do not use applications, or have no time for information technology. Defence appears unique in its desire to spend so much of its budget on technology and so many of its leaders to flout it.

Some remain convinced that basic navigational skills are more useful than GPS or that fitness trumps technology. This misses the fundamental point that future successful military leaders will be both fit and understand technology, they will still understand the traditional and enhance it with technology.

This is the truth behind automation – it enhances human ingenuity and defence is not separate from this disruption.

Military leaders who eschew this automated enhancement will not be championed but be defeated.

Therefore, I propose that:

• Current military academies and training centres seek to implement and adopt automated tools and practices in every aspect of training.

• We need to encourage current and future leader that understanding and exploiting AI is at the very heart of their thinking about warfare.

• I have said before that doctrine needs to be rewritten with automation in every element, questioning how it changes our approach to conflict.

• We need to develop insatiable curiosity about the potential of technology within all our military leaders, especially the fighting arms.

• We must generate a cohort of leaders who will test and explore the greater potential of technology rather than ignore or abhor it.

Future leaders are curious, not curios. They need our help to foster and fuel their curiosity.

The Future of Warfighting is Today: the strategic case for interoperability within and across nations Pt2

Midjourney prompt: Modern military helicopter desert

A two-part recommendation that interoperability demands more investment and greater prioritisation from current military and government expenditures. Reviewing the Deloitte Center for Government Insights recommendations of September 2021 in the light of Ukraine and economic uncertainty, we find that today is the right time to increase interoperability within and across the free world. In this second part, we look at the case for investment.

The maturity of Interoperability is not matching maturing of threats.

Our strategy review found that defence departments and ministries are devising to combat today's challenges with other government agencies, nations, and commercial companies. Yet, our interoperability maturity assessments identified that most militaries organisationally struggle to enable the coordination required for today's defence challenges. They simply lack enough time, money, or people within their departments to address various challenges.

Take the U.S. Cyber Command's strategy of "defend forward" to counter grey zone cyber threats, placing U.S. military cyber experts overseas to disrupt attacks headed for the United States. This strategy demands coordination with host nations, military and security agency cyber forces and familiarity with commercial technologies [1]. More profoundly, we highlighted how coordination needs to extend into the temporal dimension rather than mere military domains and that synchronisation of response and decision-making would require significantly increased interoperability maturity [2]. The current patchwork approach to link processes and activities for interoperability adds costs, creates vulnerabilities, exposes capability gaps, and remains rigid to diverse defence challenges.

Interoperability investments now return greater value

Traditional interoperability investments faced two test criteria: increase political legitimacy as part of a larger coalition and improve operational efficiency. The costs of purchasing new common equipment, the time to develop coordinated operations, and the investment to agree shared doctrine had to be less than the value of these two criteria.

Last year, increasing NATO defence expenditure was a political choice made in the context of recovery from a global pandemic. The strategic logic existed but the value did not justify the financial investment. With a ground war in Europe, the investment in NATO is far more apparent today. However, nations seek primarily to invest in national defence industry and capabilities first and still place interoperability second.

This decision is basic economic logic, investing in industry to maintain productivity and national economies. Purchasing new weapons and vehicles and recruiting soldiers has an immediate investment benefit. Yet it does not capitalise on the benefits of interoperability that we identified last year.

Investing in the maturity of interoperability delivers economic and defence benefits.

The need to face a changing global situation with increased interoperability funding is justification alone for investing more. The broader and immediate benefits of doing so make this a compelling case to ignore.

By itself, our third interoperability rule, interoperability today is a strategic advantage, offers significant benefit for investment especially when facing increasingly complex and diverse challenges. Increased interoperability provides the ability to match and flex against threats. At a time of increased conflict and tension, we cannot wait to create a strategic advantage until the last safe moment.

With the realisation of our second rule, no nation can meet today's defence challenges alone, then interoperability investment becomes a clear priority. Investment in interoperability maturity across defence, other national security agencies, government departments, NGOs, and industry will create resilient structures and establish robust relationships to counter known threats and respond to unexpected new ones. This investment requires coordination to avoid every element developing isolated interoperability solutions. Based on our studies, that coordination is justified as each respective entity will also improve its abilities to adapt, modernise, and transform its own core functions from this investment.

Our final rule, interoperability is not new, is the platform on which any effective investment can be made. The research showed that effective interoperability required an existing organisation to focus the investment, an agreement to define its nature, and a platform to enable the investment. Where none of these criteria existed, the maturity was low, and effectiveness was limited. We could see performance improvements where one or more existed. Combining all three accelerated maturity and effectiveness significantly, especially when based on existing structures and relationships.

Interoperability is different from investment in modern technologies or dramatic digital transformation. The allure of the new too often tempts military planners, and militaries may still require these different technology or transformation investments. However, when a choice must be made to ensure the best investment decision, options that support interoperability are more likely to empower transformation than one that merely seeks to pursue new equipment. The nature of interoperability makes it an accelerator for both technology and transformation.

This is also not an argument to invest in traditional forms of interoperability to spend newly increased defence budgets. Purchasing common technologies is a useful step, but defence organisations need to mature beyond their conventional interoperability standards to include other government organisations, private industry and the various politics, policies, and economics that come with broader coordination. Today's challenges may resemble those of the past, but their character is new. Investment in interoperability maturity that enables militaries to operate outside themselves is required.

The future of warfare is today. 

Defence has spent the last 20 years responding to challenges while claiming that the current challenge is fundamentally different from any future challenge. They have been countering global terrorism, stabilising and then extracting from failed states, countering threats to the rules-based world order from resurgent peer adversaries and addressing increased grey zone & cyber threats. Each has distracted and diverted funding and prioritisation. Yet every challenge required and benefitted from interoperability investment.

Increasing interoperability investment is now critical. We can no longer delay with European conflict, increased tensions in Asia, growing diversity of cyber threats, and more demanding challenges to the rules-based international order. Interoperability improves our ability to meet these challenges and enhances our collective abilities to adapt to new threats. Our conclusion last year remains the same today: By cultivating interoperability today, defence organisations can be ready for the future, whatever it may bring.

[1] U.S. cyber strategy of persistent engagement & defend forward: implications for the alliance and intelligence collection: Intelligence and National Security: Vol 35, No 3 (tandfonline.com)

[2] The temporal dimension of defending forward | Deloitte

The Future of Warfare is Today: The strategic advantage from interoperability within and across nations

Midjourney prompt: Modern military soldiers

A two-part recommendation that interoperability demands more investment and greater prioritisation from current military and government expenditures. Reviewing the Deloitte Center for Government Insights recommendations of September 2021 in the light of Ukraine and economic uncertainty, we find that today is the right time to increase interoperability within and across the free world. In this first part, we look at the interoperability rules for future warfare.

Last year, The Deloitte Center for Government Insights reviewed twelve countries and sixty representatives to identify ways and insights to improve effectiveness across key military areas. We identified four leading defence challenges across all respondents:

• Peer warfare.

• Technology-driven grey zone threats.

• Limited-scale warfare.

• Defending the rules-based international order.

The goal was to generate discussion to improve global initiatives and demonstrate the realisation that more significant aligned activity was essential for intelligence age warfare. The outputs are collated here under Future of Warfighting.

At the time, very few individuals viewed Ukraine and Russia as a potentially imminent conflict [1], most believing that the conflict would continue to be tense rather than hot[2]. Despite the 2014 invasion, it looked likely that Russia would not be bold enough to strike deeper into Ukraine. Behind the scenes, military leaders feared that any Russian aggression would be short and vicious.

Today, Russia's invasion has accelerated the West's need for honesty to recognise, understand, and respond to pressing international interoperability issues and collectively act to meet the identified defence challenges listed above. Ukraine has valiantly resisted Russian aggression with global support and stubborn bravery whilst offering hard, violent proof for the value of interoperability and international cooperation.

The West cannot wait another year, and Ukraine cannot wait any longer.

Our recommendations start with three simple rules. The first is that Interoperability is not new and that most military operations worldwide are multilateral. Militaries value interoperability and, when pushed, will work hard to resolve any issues. Yet there has been little incentive to make interoperability a top priority until now, despite clear examples in recent military history. For instance, the Anglo-French combined expeditionary forces in the Sahel for Operation Barkhane struggled with basic equipment interfaces and more challenging differences in rules of engagement and command philosophy [3].

In Ukraine, interoperability is now a priority where its forces receive Western equipment in limited packets. Its soldiers learn and integrate these items alongside their own tactics and other equipment. We see the strain on supply, logistics, and operational tempo as they learn these lessons in combat.

No nation has enough precision-guided munitions to sustain a protracted peer engagement [4]

Our second rule is that no nation, even the U.S., can meet today's defence challenges alone. Our research across all twelve countries identified stark shortcomings in the supply chain, stockpiles reduced under budgetary controls, and closed production lines that reduced restocking responsiveness. At the other end of the spectrum, we saw that it was clear that no military can, by itself, address the flood of misinformation permeating social media platforms that characterise intelligence age operations.

Success today requires militaries to operate outside themselves, to be interoperable with other nations, other government agencies, and even commercial industries in new ways. Ukraine starkly shows this rule to be valid, with both Russian and Ukrainian militaries struggling to supply their artilleries, replenish depleted munitions, and train or operate with other nations. 

All armies are calculating the ammunition and munition expenditure rate in Ukraine and comparing it to their stockpiles and reserves. The comparison is grim, with even significant forces seeing forecast depletion of all munitions measured in days rather than weeks, whilst restocking from suppliers is measured in months rather than days. Hoping to fight differently to avoid this attrition challenge lacks credibility, as the adversary often sets the nature of conflict as much as the home side.

Nations putting in the challenging work now will meet the demands of the future, whatever they may be.

Our third rule is that Interoperability is more than just a political expedient, a way of growing exports, or demonstrating global reach. Interoperability today is a strategic advantage. Interoperability gives militaries more options, greater strategic agility, with the flexibility to adopt and adapt to the flow of conflict with greater confidence.

Consider the view that Russia saw Ukraine's reach toward the West and NATO as a threat because it delivered this strategic advantage. A Ukrainian military with NATO equipment, operating within NATO's cyber security and intelligence reach, and resupplied from across NATO industries would significantly deter any future Russian interference. Greater interoperability between NATO and Ukraine offered a strategic advantage that Russia could not counter. If completed, interoperability would not only make Ukraine resistant to Russian aggression but also confident enough to reclaim the regions seized by Russia in 2014. This proposition is evident in how NATO intelligence, supplies, and equipment bolster Ukrainian effectiveness today.

Interoperability rules are more relevant today than last year.

We reviewed the political, strategic, and doctrinal documents of twelve countries across North America, Europe, and Asia to determine their leading defence challenges. At the time, conversations around peer-on-peer warfare were considered increasingly irrelevant, with the need for broad-spectrum military, political, and economic warfare highly unlikely. Yet all countries showed strong indicators that peer-on-peer conflict remained a key challenge.

This insight went further than soldiers still fighting the last war or purchasing old capabilities from previous conflicts. We identified convincing evidence that all surveyed militaries were adopting innovative technologies, tactics, and toolsets to face new ways of warfare. We also determined successful adoption often occurred when armies implemented these new tools over existing structures rather than merely replacing systems. An infantry brigade could exploit UAV capabilities far quicker than asking a new UAV brigade to operate alongside the infantry one. The infantry brigade may, subsequently, fight in a way unrecognisable to its predecessors, but the core skill set of peer-to-peer conflict seems to underpin successful capability adoption.

Interoperability provides an advantage within as well as across a military force. Our research [5] examined the scale and demands of interoperability across four military functions at five maturity levels, from Level 1 Baseline (able to interoperate with secure systems and trusted data) to Level 5 Systemic (internationally coordinated responses, with automated tooling and shared cultures). We could see that adopting new capabilities was easier for organisations at the higher levels of interoperability and that these same, higher-level organisations could adapt existing structures faster.

This is a crucial lesson as militaries seek to converge across domains and environments and address multi-domain integration to meet current military threats. Interoperability provides a strategic advantage, a force multiplying effect on performance, and enhances adaptability against threats and change. This alone should justify increased investment, yet we are not seeing this reality.

In the second part, we examine this case for more significant interoperability investment.

[1] The West faces a test of unity over Russia as tensions intensify between Moscow and NATO | World News | Sky News

[2] Kremlin says NATO expansion in Ukraine is a 'red line' for Putin | Reuters

[3] https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/industry/public-sector/future-of-warfare.html#endnote-2

[4] https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/industry/public-sector/future-of-warfare.html

[5] https://www2.deloitte.com/global/en/pages/public-sector/articles/future-of-warfighting.html#:~:text=Interoperability%20functions%3A

Wordle as a story of information warfare

"Is Wordle getting harder?"

"Wordle sells out."

"What in the world is happening to our beloved Wordle?"

"How Wordle won over the world."

You may have heard of Wordle, where online players attempt to guess a five-letter word correctly in six or fewer tries. It now has millions of daily players and was invented by one person as a simple game for their partner to enjoy. 

In late January, The New York Times paid "low seven figures" to own the game, website and code exclusively. The website is vital for the game as there is no separate app or program, and the entire solution to the game is openly available on that single page. 

That purchase created a unique learning experience for people interested in how information and data shape our perceptions and reality. Three public conversations started almost immediately after the purchase:

1. New York Times has changed the game and made it worse /harder/ easier /American/elitist.

2. The acquisition means people no longer trust the game to be fair or the same.

3. The players no longer feel that they own the game and that others now own it.

Internet forums and panels have aggressively debated these points. People sought out like-minded thinkers to agree with them and shouted down those who didn't. 

Minimally, these conversations reflect more prominent topics and conspiracy theories shared across the internet. It allows us to watch an information narrative develop and evolve within a limited scope. 

Crucially, we can watch these stories develop with a fixed baseline of knowledge.

Here is why this story is a great reference point: nothing has actually changed in the game, it is all narrative and stories

The website contains all of the answers and underlying code, and it always has. The core data and game is still the same and openly available.*

Therefore, we can see if anything changes in the code and compare physical change with perceived difference. 

Currently, it's all perception and story rather than truth.

Since the acquisition, the New York Times has removed a handful of potentially offensive words, but the answers for each day remain the same and stay in the same order. Previously "Boozy" followed "Dozen", and at a specific point in the future, "S*a*e" will follow "R*r*l" (I'm trying to avoid spoilers for the answers in 2026).

So, if nothing has changed, why is this critical for information warfare? Why are people so excited and angry if it's still all the same?

The Wordle case shows us how narrative shapes and reinforces our opinions rather than data. 

People are always quick to blame anything else rather than their performance; that is usually human nature. Rather than having a poor day, we generate new narratives to blame factors outside our control. Whether it was not wearing a lucky item, the change in weather, or a sinister organisation, we tell ourselves that we are not at fault.

Our online lives make it simpler to accuse these outside influences and find other people who share our perspectives. These groups then reinforce our belief, becoming the oft-quoted "online echo chamber".

We can see these echo chambers form online around Wordle topics. Reddit communities have multiple threads about how Wordle changed, how to protest for the changes to be reversed, and even how to enter protest words in the game "as they are logging and ranking even incorrect words."

This last thread is pointless as the New York Times does not log the entries, and players cannot enter the proposed protest as they are not recognised words. Yet it is indicative of the sentiment**. 

We tell ourselves that free and inquisitive journalism will counter echo chambers. Yet the Wordle example is less convincing in this regard. Like the articles at the start of this piece, online stories significantly reflect the echo chamber more than counter it.

Even when people pointed out the freely visible answers, articles continue to question the data. 

"Ruining my day again... Some people believe double-letter words have appeared more frequently in the game since it was acquired by NYT and have accused the publication of adding them."

Even credible newspapers portray any counter-narrative as in the minority, openly questioned, or represented as an outside source. A typical example is, "if you believe one computer scientist, Wordle has not changed."

We now see people with an existing mistrust of The New York Times use this opportunity to reinforce and share their beliefs. Comments in articles reference other issues related to The New York Times or broader assumptions, such as "You can never trust the NYT" or "Of course, they changed it. It’s what they do".

This narrative expansion interlocks the Wordle story with other stories. If a reader believes that Worlde was changed, then it is plausible that other alleged cases must also be authentic, regardless of how fanciful.

It's just a game, so why does this matter for information warfare?

We see a few worrying trends in this simple story about a game. Verifiable facts and data are not trusted online. Questions are asked about data, the informed expert is placed in a minority, or shown as coming from outside the target audience and so cannot be trusted. An online narrative is repeated, often by the organisations that we trust to counter or test those narratives. 

The dominant narrative is often the first to gain traction online. Countering that narrative requires more than shooting it down with truth and facts or even people who are specialists. In some cases, knowing about the subject appears significantly more negative when countering the narrative. Readers are unlikely to follow a link and examine the answers within the code (the link is below) and instead continue to believe their preferred narrative.

The TV advert staple of a scientist in a white coat providing data is now actively mistrusted.

We learn from this example to tell a story rather than quote evidence and that merely sharing data is insufficient. Any data must be wrapped into the current narrative and shape a future one. Publishing data about deaths will not change opinion if the audience does not believe the story about the cause of death. It is probably better to use a report that does not directly confront your subject's prejudices before comparing the two cases to avoid instant rejection. 

Ideally, the dominant narrative is based on truth, facts, and data, and is adopted because it is both factual and compelling. Sometimes, this will win the information war, yet it is rare to see such a juxtaposition of truth, narrative and data.

The Ukrainian Government's current online narrative is compelling for these very reasons. They have an emotional story, expert opinion and personal witness, with clear evidence to support their campaign. It is a true story.

In contrast, the Wordle stories are regularly false yet compelling, playing to our prejudices and fears and countering evidence with further tales. Their purpose is unclear or genuinely malicious, and they become dominant with sufficient repetition by individuals and trusted organisations.

Wordle may be a game involving five-letter words invented by one person as a game for their partner. It also tells us how we use words rather than data to change our beliefs and that even simple stories are now regularly used to divide rather than unite us together.

Reference

*For reference, the latest version of the code, and all the answers, are here (WARNING this link may give you all the answers to Wordle): https://www.nytimes.com/games/wordle/main.4d41d2be.js

**Although some readers may read this last statement and still subconsciously be saying, "You only say that they do not log entries, but do they?

Is Wordle getting harder? You're not alone if you feel that way (nj.com)

Wordle Is Now Owned by the New York Times (gizmodo.com)

What in the world is happening to our beloved Wordle? | Puzzle games | The Guardian

How Wordle won over the world (telegraph.co.uk)

'Ruining my day again': Wordle 252 frustrates players (yahoo.com)

Embedding sustainability at the heart of MOD operations

With its imperative for a military edge, the MOD is continually focused on driving innovation and military advantage into its operations. A similar focus is starting to apply to climate concerns. Both Defence and climate protection represent true public goods: they are non-excludable and non-rivalrous to the population; we all have it or none of us does. MOD recognises that sustainability and climate concerns are increasingly within its mode of operations.

With its significant financial expenditure, the MOD has considerable responsibility and an excellent opportunity to drive the sustainability agenda, enhancing inter-generational equity and stewardship. Yet, it must do this while meeting defined levels of equipment and platform readiness without compromising capability and recognising, in many places, its over-heated budgets.

Start as a 'fast follower' to then become a 'trail blazer'

The MOD has traditionally sought to lead on implementing innovative ideas, and it has also adapted tried and tested innovations from industries that are not historically defence-focused. This approach of broadening the scope and reapplying technologies can lead to sustainability improvements.

Take the Space industry; for decades, it has utilised solar panels. The MOD employs this same technology as a 'fast follower' by reapplying solar-powered technology for defence purposes. Realising the benefits and capitalising on critical learnings, MOD can bring this development back in-house and become a 'trail blazer' to explore similar technologies applicable in the specific defence context for its own use or export.

With the recent establishment of Space Command, the UK MOD now has the ability to direct this development and agenda. And it can do this using a host of technologies that have been proven elsewhere.

It will be essential to find a balance between in-house initiatives that drive sustainability and new contracting mechanisms that deliver better results through others. A focus on rapid product development, category management, and better collaboration with industry when contracting for outcomes are essential. In all cases, the goal should nurture and retain scarce skillsets with effective partnering.

Shape the supply chain to be more sustainable

In terms of scale and time, the MOD has the largest and longest delivery programmes in government. MOD will finalise financial budgets and delivery plans today for equipment programmes delivered, deployed and utilised beyond the 2040s.

Defence programmes can be among the most pollutant, accounting for 50 per cent of UK central government's emissions. These programmes are economically important too, supporting 260,000 supply chain jobs in the UK. This places UK 2050 Net Zero goals well within the planning horizon in defence procurement and proposed government measures, including mandating suppliers to implement carbon reduction plans, cannot be ignored.

The government has recognised the acute scarcity of natural resources and Defence's massive drag due to the size and longevity of its programmes. The government wants to be firmly in the front seat of the solution when it comes to sustainability.

There is a role for MOD to play in shaping the supply chain through stronger category management approaches, closer long-term partnering with the supply chain on technology investment and adoption, and industrial strategy. This includes the MOD working closely with other departments, such as Business Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS) and Home Office, where there is commonality around energy and the manufacturing base needed to support Defence procurement.

Supporting UK industry for global impact

The MOD should leverage its natural clusters in the UK to consolidate supply chains and develop home-grown industries around these critical locations. This localisation could yield far-reaching benefits by creating jobs and reducing carbon emissions by requiring less need for long-distance transport.

In the period 2017-2018, the MOD achieved a 10 per cent reduction in fuel consumption – equivalent to 74 million litres of fuel consumed. This roughly equates to the average family car being able to drive 638 million miles. The MOD could also mandate greater renewable energy as a fuel source with relevant and appropriate procurements.

Defence needs a technology advantage to gain visibility of its entire supply chain, beyond just the immediate suppliers, and develop a more complete understanding of the environmental impact of its equipment programme. This can help MOD and industry to influence the behaviour of sub-tier suppliers with respect to sustainability policies.

Tackle these problems collectively

On the other hand, participating in multi-national procurement and manufacturing opportunities, where appropriate, is another way to achieve environmental improvements. The NATO alliances could provide commonality and modularity across components, systems, and platforms throughout the defence community. Incorporating a build once, use many approach could help cut R&D and recurring manufacturing costs and reduce duplication.

The proposals above won't resolve all of the MOD's sustainability challenges but could provide decisive steps in the right direction. The MOD is trying to balance multiple problems that range from the existential, such as constantly changing Defence threats, to the financial, such as over-heated budgets, to the logistical, a diverse and costly portfolio of assets ranging from light weapons to ships and submarines to procure and support. Amongst all these, it can adopt a more assertive approach to the pressing sustainability challenge.

Warfare in the Intelligent Age

Midjourney prompt: Warfare in information

The Intelligent Age has replaced the Information Age. Most military leaders are still struggling with information age thinking and most of their plans will not deliver for at least five years.

Therefore, four changes are needed to accelerate and adapt a military organisation to win in the Intelligent Age:

1. enhanced leadership that focuses on faster decisions;

2. prioritised automation of most routine human activities, so that humans can focus on more valuable cognitive and creative tasks;

3. recognition that more power exists outside defence than within, and that militaries need to adapt, adopt and operate outside their traditional organisations;

4. transform procurement first to meet military aspirations.

The Information Age was characterised by open and rapid data-sharing; social media-driven utilisation of personal data, often for advertising; and integration of knowledge systems. Information became the new oil, according to one truism of the times. Today, militaries are struggling to adopt and adapt these characteristics even as they are now becoming outdated.

The Intelligent Age is characterised by the Age of With, where every human works with intelligent machines in every activity. It merges the digital, physical and human worlds, collaborating across the boundaries of each to improve performance and empower smarter humans to achieve more at incredible speed.

This accelerated intelligent enhancement threatens to disrupt adoption of information age thinking and to derail preparations for the future. This provides both a military threat yet also an opportunity to disturb slower-moving adversaries by adopting four changes:

Leadership, but better

Leadership will remain critical for military effectiveness in the intelligent age, and ‘intelligent-enhanced’ leadership will prove even more decisive and emphatic by performing better than humans. Age of With leadership constructs acceptable solutions faster than its adversaries, who struggle to collate and comprehend the flood of information ‘oil’ across their processes. Improving decision-making with intelligent abilities will increase the probability of positive outcomes, confer advantage, and enhance military effect.

Automation where it delivers

Good leadership understands that humans are too expensive and valuable to waste on the mundane. The mindset of starting with what can be automated and building upwards must fundamentally change to one that starts with what humans must do and automating everything else. Intelligent systems are better suited to replace routine activities. Highly trained and scarce military humans need to prioritise activities that can only they can do.

Intelligent age militaries must avoid the costly pitfall of sequentially automating individual activities and processes and instead automate functions and roles at a massive scale—including entire staff branches who can be freed for more valuable duties. Those that harness the tremendous growth of automation will be the ones to gain the most significant advantages over adversaries.

Growth will also be faster and cheaper than equivalent step-change through process automation as leaders improve their critical issues by saving time, cost, and effort. A recent British Army empowerment study showed that infantry soldiers spent less than 20 per cent of their time on infantry skills, and that leaders struggling to cope with the routine present had little time to anticipate and prepare for the future.

More power outside than in

Warfare in the intelligent age recognises that, like all modern structures, there is more power outside the organisation than within it. The hierarchical command and relatively insular nature of militaries can combine falsely to reassure leaders that their team is the centre of the universe. Think of the archetypes epitomising military resilience: a battered ship at sea, a fort surrounded by enemies, or a lonely bomber heading home. These all place the military at the heart of the action.

Yet, intelligent age warfare is genuinely unrestricted, integrating national and political strategies across all aspects of a society, including financial, political, and cultural. It does not adhere to what has traditionally been seen as military domains, or deploy only traditional instruments of power. Its boundaryless nature uses intelligent systems to exploit the world outside defence domains, combining influence and power across a society’s agencies and organisations. Intelligent age military power therefore achieves its more limited objectives by using unrestricted measures across multiple vectors, such as media and the economy.

A modern military in this environment will attempt to impose their actions upon an adversary that is dynamically changing within a situation that is rapidly evolving. Enhanced leaders will need to act at increased speed, cycling faster through choices and decisions, and demanding new and original options with possible effects. Victory will depend on human ingenuity to deliver and enhance adaptation and exploitation in minutes and seconds.

Procurement transformation first

Therefore, the final, critical characteristic of enhanced warfare requires improvements to equipment and capabilities that go far beyond software enabling military platforms. Defence procurement organisations and functions must do far more than purchase technology such as AI, robotics, drones, or software for the parts on the battlefield. Every human activity in the Age of With needs enhancement and the procurement function of an intelligent age military must be the first to adopt and implement this transformation.

Without this procurement transformation, all subsequent changes will fail. Military procurement has for too long been measured by what rather than how it buys. Now, it must embrace warfare in the Intelligent Age. The function needs to adopt the mindset of ‘what must be done by humans and automate the rest.’

This will require the same aspirations that the battlefield forces must have to equip the military: use Intelligent Age approaches and methods at scale across their entire organisations. The first and most critical change will be to halt stagnant processes that plan and deliver in years and decades.

Intelligent Age Warfare enhances human insight with intelligent systems that blend physical, digital and human worlds. A successful military will enhance its decision making, improve its leadership performance, exploit power from outside the military, and apply new procurement processes to maintain these changes.

The end of the intelligent age is already foreseeable with the arrival of the quantum age. This will bring into starker contrast the immense gaps between information age and intelligent age warfare. If information was the new oil and intelligent systems the new car, quantum is the new internet. The application of quantum processing and insight will enable an intelligent age military to significantly surpass current levels of effectiveness.

Replacing the Afghanistan Lightning Rod

It is hard to easily discuss sacrifice, loss, worth, and purpose, especially in current times when all of these issues feel so raw. I wrote this piece to reconcile my own emotions and to put into context experiences that shaped my life. It is challenging to express this all in 1000 words. I hope, as a reader, that you can forgive and still discuss parts with which you may disagree.

We put a lightning rod in Afghanistan, and for twenty years, it created a costly but localised storm. We may look back, though, and think that it was a period of relative peace and calm.

In 2001, less than 30 days after 9/11, the US military and allies attacked Afghanistan in Operation Enduring Freedom. The subsequent conflict is well documented and hotly debated with the recent withdrawal and Taliban seizure of power. 

Afghanistan faces an uncertain and dark future, especially if it returns to the extremist state from before 2001. That return looks highly likely, although not inevitable. 

For Afghans, wracked by conflict for decades, it is a return to instability and fear. The period of democracy is over, with Western investment and support for the country abruptly ended.

Right now, there are questions of worth and value for Western armies, who sacrificed their soldiers to maintain that democracy and expenditure. Why did so many soldiers die only to see a return to the same state after 20 years? Why did Western nation-building fail so badly and end in a bitter defeat?

A regional perspective may provide some consolation and, sadly, significant future concerns.

Operation Enduring Freedom was a retaliation to prevent safely harboured Al-Qaeda terrorists from launching similar devasting attacks on the West, especially on US soil and harshly experience on 9/11. The operation achieved this goal, as the US defeated the Taliban state and removed security for Al-Qaeda. 

The conflict that followed was bitter, costly, and unforgiving, yet restricted to the fields and mountains of Afghanistan. The US hounded Al-Qaeda across borders, and the Taliban resisted where they could. Islamic extremists congregated and died around the Western lightning rod in Afghanistan. There were significant losses on all sides, yet there was no repeat of 9/11 elsewhere. Extremist attacks took place but without coordination. 

The US-led presence also focussed regional attention, creating a focus for nations that restricted their freedom of manoeuvre.

West of Afghanistan, Iran faced a US military presence on both sides, and US aircraft could reach Tehran from East or West. This split threat forced Iran to divert forces from its predominant zone of influence in the Gulf and disperse air defence assets countrywide. In extremes, a US attack into Iran would be slightly easier from Afghanistan, as it would avoid the Zagros Mountains that protect Iran's western flank.

In the south, Pakistan maintained an uneasy relationship with the US government and military. Accused of harbouring Al-Qaeda, military operations from Afghanistan into Pakistan were a constant issue. Most notably, Operation Neptune Spear launched into Pakistan to kill Osama Bin Laden without informing the Pakistan government.

Pakistan balanced between internal extremist support towards the Taliban and maintaining its international reputation and status. With a US presence in Afghanistan, Pakistan found it preferable to maintain its international standing and deter extremists from its soil even if it was not universally popular within Pakistan itself.

Former Russian states of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan flirted briefly with partially increased democracy to the North, yet all remain under robust presidential control. Uzbekistan signed a joint strategic agreement with the US in 2002, although relations cooled after the revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, prompting more substantial Russian influence across its former states.

To the east, 76km of Afghanistan borders China. The corridor is closed into China, with unrest in Xinjiang province on the Chinese side as the reason. China continues to see Islamic unrest in the region and has been unwilling to let that tension flourish.

Iran, Pakistan, Russia, and China had reasons to proceed cautiously with 100,000+ US and Western military in their vicinity. Consequently, the region was relatively stable.

It is already likely that the Afghanistan Taliban engages with all of these nations. The US and former Afghan rulers have consistently accused Iran of supporting the Taliban with intelligence and weapons. Russia's alleged bounty payments for Taliban killing US soldiers was a Presidential Election issue last year, and Pakistan has long been held in suspicion by the US of harbouring Taliban forces along its border. Last week, Tobias Ellwood, UK MP and Chair of the UK Defence Committee, claimed that China was already seeking trade agreements with the new Taliban government.

For each of these countries, there are significant gains with the US withdrawal and change of the Afghan government. Iran can shift West, centring its defences against any threat from the Gulf. The border with India and its internal stability will concentrate the Pakistan government. Russia can emphasise its sphere of influence across its former states without challenge. China can secure its Islamic regions and grow closer to Russia and Iran.

This power shift means that the West also needs to shift its engagement and diplomacy. The Taliban is unlikely to listen long to a US lecture on human rights or a UK diplomatic effort to encourage female education. We need to engage now through those countries with influence.

The new regime will need economic support and allies. It can survive for a while on illegal drug trades and possibly exporting the extensive collection of military equipment claimed from the Afghan military. Still, it will need stability and income to survive.

A delegation from Iran or China will have more influence over the new government, and they are also more interested in broader reciprocal agreements. It may be unpleasant for the West to deal with another country to secure stability, but doing so is in every country's interest, even in Afghanistan. 

It's a scant consolation to someone living in fear or someone dealing with a personal loss that they have contributed to reducing global terrorism, that their pain has prevented many others from feeling the same, or that their sacrifice kept a broader peace. It's also stereotyped to suggest that Afghanistan is just a piece of the Great Game between global powers once more. 

Yet, for 20 years, there has been a costly balance maintained because of the West's campaigns in Afghanistan. Now, with that presence abruptly ending in a painful downfall, that balance is no longer in place. Western governments have to sacrifice pride to secure future stability for the people in Afghanistan today, paid for by those who died in Afghanistan.

The West needs to recognise its defeat, swallow its pride, engage diplomatically through new partners, and consider whether another twenty years of relative calm is preferable to a future period of uncertainty and conflicts.

DELIVERING SOFTWARE TO THE WARFIGHTER TO ENSURE MISSION SUCCESS

Full scrip from The Royal Signals Institute Presentation, 21 Nov 2019 at NCSC.

Today’s event is around the future relevance for military information specialists, and I have been asked to highlight trends that will shape or challenge that relevance. This debate is long overdue as the impact of artificial intelligence and digital transformation are accelerating change and disruption across the whole of society, not just in defence. There are obvious challenges – how will AI affect my daily job, even will I still have a job, what will change because of AI, and how soon will it change. However, I want to highlight three deeper challenges.

Unprecedented expansion

The first large trend is the scale of the challenge facing information specialists. 50 billion internet-connected devices are going to come online by 2030. With a global population of 8.5bn, that means six times more devices than people. This also seems a low estimate, and we will probably hit that number of devices by 2025.

90 per cent of the data in the world today was generated in the last two years. Of that, 75% is never actually read – from blogs to how many times you swipe into the underground, the data that we are building is not being exploited. In Defence, the analysis figure for collected data is 95% - only 5% of information collected is analysed and only 1% of data is analysed in near real-time.

This scale is unprecedented and keeping humans at the heart of the analysis is already incredibly difficult and getting far harder. Artificial Intelligence is going to be essential to understand, comprehend and manage this complexity.

Every organisation is a software organisation

Every organisation is now a software organisation. Hiring for software engineers is growing at a rate of 11% faster outside the tech industry than within the tech industry, according to LinkedIn data. The hiring of software engineers in the auto sector is growing at three times the rate of mechanical engineers. Even in sectors and industries that are seeing significant reductions in people, we are seeing a clear growth for software developers.

Today, the military is struggling to attract and retain the best people and maintain their skills. Defence, like every sector, is starting to realise that it needs to attract the right information specialists but is yet to articulate how to present an attractive package within an increasingly competitive market.

The division between Tech and Non-Tech is rapidly vanishing

The traditional model of relying on IT departments to build custom enterprise apps or integrate off the shelf solutions is not fulfilling customer needs to keep up with the pace of change.

Enterprise demand for mobile apps is growing five times faster than IT departments can deliver. At the same time, IT staffs and budgets are facing increasing competition. They are facing a chasm of higher demand, with a shortage of resources. And traditional development cycles for custom apps can take up to a year, depending on complexity. Once they’re deployed, business needs may have already changed.

Architects, Engineers and Users are blurring

Business units and IT departments need a better, faster way to address business needs that’s scalable and flexible – yet maintains control over security and compliance. We are seeing increasing demand by users to develop their solutions using no code or low code capabilities and expecting resource-constrained IT departments to enable rather than hinder that demand.

These changes and new approaches are creating new challenges to everyone on the planet, not just defence, but we can see three big challenges facing information specialists.

The enterprise no longer sits just one side of a fence

The first is around how do we design the future? We see a future where AI systems will interact with other AI systems, where data will be created, updated, amended, even deleted without human interaction. Where one AI system will take data from another, enrich that data, use it to make crucial insights and then pass it to another AI system. The enterprise no longer sits one side of a fence or one route through a complex supply chain. The outcome should be a better world, but only if we design and architect that connected and complicated world with humans at the heart. The challenge facing architects is to comprehend the increasingly complex and, more importantly, to start collaboratively resolving complexity today. 

AI is getting better at the mundane and enhancing the valuable

Our second challenge faces developers. Our current engineers and developers are already struggling to stay ahead of technology and changes. Increasingly we are seeing AI impacting on how engineers develop or build solutions. We see AI being used to review and test solutions, and AI developing code itself. AI is getting better at the mundane and enhancing the value. That pace of change is growing faster yet developers are not adapting faster. Developers need to focus on how AI will complement and enhance how they work, rather than seeking to duplicate or replicate tasks that AI can do better.

Users will be challenged to remain at the heart of a future enterprise that is increasingly AI-driven

Finally, users will be challenged to remain at the heart of a future enterprise that is increasingly AI-driven. On one side this will be a daily issue for the user community. Yet we see users doing those tasks that traditionally were delivered by developers. Users will write their code, they will develop solutions, and AI will help them succeed. If engineers are going to struggle with exploiting AI to improve their ways of working, it will be even harder for users who lack engineering rigour and knowledge to achieve similar tasks. 

The Military and Market Advantages from Data and Technology

DSEI Maritime Strategic Conference 2019

The following is the full script from a presentation made on Monday, 9 September 2019 at DSEI, London. It does not include the demonstration shown to the audience.

I was asked today to talk about the military and market advantage available from data and technology. However, I’m not going to talk about that subject. Instead, I am going to show that data and technology IS the market or military and that it is how you THINK that makes the advantage.

50 billion connected devices are going to come online by 2030. Population estimates for the same time are 8.5bn so six times devices per person. This seems a low estimate, to me, and I believe that we will hit that figure much sooner, probably by 2025.

Those devices will be collecting, processing, sharing and analyzing data across the globe. That brings the second figure in front of you into focus.

90 percent of the data in the world today was generated in the last two years. Of that, 75% is never actually read – from blogs to how many times you swipe into the underground, the data that we are building is not being managed. It is not being exploited. It is simply being created and then shelved.

In Defence, the analysis figure for collected data is over 95% - only 5% of information collected is analysed and only 1% of data is analysed in near real time or real time. We are simply producing more data from more devices yet we are not using that technology or data to empower people or organisations.

Which is where Microsoft is using its mission to make a difference. Our mission is to empower every person and organization on the planet to achieve more.

We make small businesses more productive, multinationals more competitive, governments more efficient, and improve outcomes using data and technology. Collectively, we can impact the 7 billion people on the planet through the power of technology.

Our world view is that we are living in the era of the intelligent cloud and intelligent edge. It’s being driven by rapid advances in three underlying technologies:

1. First, computing is becoming ubiquitous and distributed – with the ability to adapt to a wide range of inputs, whether that is touch, speech, vision or gesture.

2. Second, AI is becoming infused into every experience, mediating our interactions and distilling knowledge from everything around us. Defence still sees AI as 5 years away. In Microsoft, we know that it was 5 years ago and defence has to catch up.

3. And, third the interaction model we have with computers and computing is no longer device-first, it’s human-first and includes all the devices in our lives. People are able to engage with data and technology where they need it, when they need and to use it in ways that empower them real time. They no longer need to head back into an office, log onto multiple systems using multiple passwords in order to make a difference. They can make a difference using their phones, watches, visors on Hololens. Data and technology, today, is ubiquitous.

Data and technology today has also moved out of the technology and IT sector. As a percentage of world GDP, tech spend will reach 10 percent by 2030, up from 5 percent today. That’s a 14 trillion dollar opportunity. But the even bigger opportunity is that other 90 percent. Because that 90 percent will also be impacted by digital technology.

Hiring for software engineers is growing at a rate 11% faster outside the tech industry than within the tech industry, according to LinkedIn data. The number of software engineers is growing at 3X the rate of mechanical engineers.

Last week, someone asked me how many Royal Signals Soldiers would need to be able to code in 2025 – I asked why would anyone not be able to code in 2025 and why are you assuming that it will be a minority? Today every company is a digital company, and every organization will need tech intensity to compete and grow.

So how are we seeing successful companies grow and be empowered in a world of data and technology?

We use a concept of Tech Intensity, or for military users, Technology Tempo. This is the speed that a person or organization can make an impact relative to their competition or adversary.

Tech Intensity = (Tech Adoption x Tech Capability) ^ Trust

It’s a simple formula, but it’s critical when we think about what we hope to achieve.

In Defence, we often look at the second part, Tech Capability, and focus our effort, time and money on buying the latest, best bit of technology. The black box that makes things better.

Instead, we need to concentrate more on the first part, Tech Adoption, and spend time and resource deciding how we think digital, how we use digital and how we acquire digital. An organization with poor, slow processes that buys the latest and best software or hardware to accelerate delivery will just have faster poor, slow processes. We all need to think digitally across our businesses and organisations.

The third part of this equation is trust – both trust in technology and trust in their mission and business model. None of this is possible without trust. There are two aspects to this …

1. First, trust in business model and mission. At a time when digital technology is transforming every industry and every part of our daily life and work, when we are becoming increasingly disrupted by data and technology, we need to build trust in what we are doing. As leaders, in this room, we need to have teams that trust and believe in what they are doing and how they are doing it.

2. Second, instilling trust in technology. It’s why we believe privacy is a fundamental human right. It’s why we have an end to end cybersecurity approach to protect our customers. And, it’s why we believe in responsible AI, and ask the tough questions, like not just what computers can do but what they should do.

We need to deliver trust in technology, as we heard this morning from other speakers, so that it is reliable and delivers in the most demanding situations.

Building this trust requires changing our cultures. For military users, the purpose and utility of missions is clear although we sometimes reserve missions for military operations rather than changing culture. Missions and purpose drive culture.

Satya Nadella, Microsoft’s CEO, said, “As a culture, we are moving from a group of people who know it all to a group of people who want to learn it all. This is the only way we’ll make progress toward our mission to empower every person and every organization on the planet to achieve more.”

Organizations are starting to understand that while technology is important, alongside customers, their employees are at the centre of any transformation. If people lack the right mindset to change and the current organizational practices are flawed, digital transformation will simply magnify those flaws. CIOs play a leading role in guiding CEOs to digital business, however managers and employees will need to navigate the digital frontier together, which requires a new set of leadership skills. Management’s challenge is to figure out how to capture the benefits of digitization while minimizing the costs – and making sure those costs are shared and not borne disproportionately by one group.

We should be looking at new military doctrine not around how we fight campaigns or conduct battle group attacks. We need a new doctrine for digital thinking in defence across strategy, through acquisition, and down to individual people. All of our business needs to start by thinking digital.

Harvard Business Review reported this year that 87% of senior business leaders identify digitalization as now a priority and in many cases is a do-or-die imperative.

One of IDC’s digital transformation predictions for 2019 is that by 2020, at least 55% of organizations will be digitally determined, transforming markets and re-imagining the future through new business models and digitally enabled products and services.

In a digital business transformation context, all these aspects – business functions, processes, assets, models, and activities – are interconnected. This is an essential aspect of digital transformation: the interdependency and inter-connectedness of everything. Ultimately, success in the digital age lies not in the efficiency of technology or collecting data but in the dexterity and adaptability of the people who wield it. Digital is a defence-wide strategic priority – and there's much more work to be done.

So what is the market or military advantage of data and technology? It is simply that data and technology allow you stay in the market and remain in the fight. Your peers and adversaries also have access to the same data and technology. Advantage, then, is obtained by how you think and use this opportunity. That is why we need to start thinking digital to gain advantage.

Think Digital Doctrine

Midjourney prompt: Soldier thinking digital

Great military doctrine explains how to think rather than what to think. Yet there is a glaring omission in current theory and thinking within Western militaries - their thinking starts with how to think analogue rather than digital.

Quite bluntly, analogue thinking is crippling our decision-makers and, if not stopped, will kill our soldiers in a future conflict. That is why we need to think digitally in Defence.

One analogue example would be military decision-makers who still examine one or two options and then decide their best course, whether delivering military effect or acquiring capabilities. Digital thinkers would investigate multiple nuanced cases and derive an optimised solution from the wealth of available data. Digital thinkers explore and test viable options rapidly to assess their relative viability.

Consider two organisations, both adopting the same digital capability. One organisation has maintained the same ways of working for 50 years with their same organisation structures, their decision-making processes, their selection and training of people, their acquisition processes and their adoption of new technologies. The other organisation has rebuilt their structures, decision-making, training, acquisition and adoption processes from a digital perspective, driven by data, and implements new thinking rapidly across its entire business. 

It is clear to see which one of these organisations will see the most significant improvements from the same digital capability or new platform.

Common Think Digital Indicators

Digital thinkers typically employ a few similar approaches and techniques:

1. A desire to learn. Their growth mindset, the desire to be a "learn-it-all" rather than a "know-it-all", is a typical indicator of thinking digital. They encourage open learning and a thirst for improvement. They accept that anyone can get better at something as technology enhances rather than replaces human ingenuity. Crucially, they know that failure is essential on the path to mastery.

2. A consistent application of lean and agile approaches. They empower decision making and delegate authority, place a high value on the economy of effort, and create trust in leadership and display faith in people delivering the process.

3. Tolerance of failure. They test and pivot with the recognition that a wrong decision quickly corrected is better than a wrong decision pursued regardless. They encourage learning from failure with rapid testing of ideas and reviews of progress and then share successful experiences and knowledge to help others learn without repeating the same errors.

4. Desire to move faster. They increase the tempo of delivery by amplifying people and processes. They optimise people and processes through thinking digitally and then apply technology to accelerate results. 

We can apply the above list to military operations or successful digital businesses. It is less comfortable to use this list on the broader defence environment, whether military, public service or defence industry. In these areas, too often, technology compensates and hides poor processes or analogue thinking. 

Measures to implement Think Digital

There are a few quick measures that Defence can implement to deliver the necessary change and catch up with peers or adversaries. Some of these ideas include:

1. Leadership – Leaders must drive the think digital agenda, embed it into every activity, and get thinking digital just done. Leaders will need to engage their middle leadership, their Sergeants and Captains, with the message that everyone is digital.

2. Commitment – Change mindset and culture by committing at least 20% of the time for both leaders and training to fix their shortcomings. That includes evolving personal reviews, promotion selection and digital skills training. Every soldier or officer should be assessed for their digital skills and set goals to improve their skills, based on their actual abilities, not some mythical idea based on an average person in that role. If an opponent were physically fitter than the UK Military, then every British soldier would be doing extra physical training. Bluntly, our opponents are digitally fitter than us.

3. Make it Real – digital thinking needs to be written down, clearly expressed, made public, and made unavoidable. 

• Start rewriting every doctrine publication from a digital perspective, and not just the communications topics. This action prevents individuals from rejecting change or pointing to out-dated approaches.

• Every performance report should consider digital abilities, and not only in technical branches. Measuring what matters is a critical approach to adopt digital thinking.

• Every training course should incorporate digital assessments, training and views. This change enforces implementation of think digital approaches.

We need to choose a think digital doctrine.

Microsoft believes that every organisation is a digital organisation, impacted already by digital adoption and capabilities. The military does not ignore this fact but thinks that technology will replace their lack of thinking and ability in this area. It will not. Instead, defence organisations need to amplify thinking digital with digital processes adopted by digitally smart people, then accelerate this adoption with more intelligent digital capabilities. Across Defence, we need to choose a think digital doctrine.

Opinions linked to presentations at DSEI19, September 2019.

Bits not Blitz

https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/general-sir-gordon-messenger-military-must-wake-up-to-information-war-cqflf90fj

How does the UK military gain Information Advantage in the next war?

General Sir Gordon Messenger claims information advantage is more important than physical platforms. He said that the information capability gap needed the most focus by the UK Military. 

“ Our ability to respond faster through cleverer decision-making which is enabled by the flow of information, is actually frankly as important if not even more important than whether our tanks out-range an anti-tank missile”[1]

The need to win the information war concerns him more than the latest model of tank, fast jet or warship. Yet, if another country sought Information Advantage, what could their military easily achieve?

Three ideas would be: 

Digital Skills; 

Digital Transformation; 

Democratise Information.

Introduce and Assess Digital Skills across the Defence Workforce

A rival nation would introduce Digital Skills to their military. These are essential skills to understand the digital transformation shaping society and are essential for a dynamic economy and business. Lorry drivers dealing with driverless vehicles, doctors using AI for diagnosis or school children learning coding for the future all need these skills. So do our soldiers.

Yet in military circles there is still a certain badge to be digitally illiterate, even people in important digital positions proudly claiming that, “they are the least digital person you could meet”. This must change through simple education and awareness. A great start would be Microsoft’s Digital Skills [2] initiative providing free online training for all ages and experiences. Any military seeking to improve could easily access these essential courses.

An annual assessment of Digital Skills, the same as weapon and fitness tests for all serving personnel, would provide the benchmark of whether a military is truly digital. This should be for all and not just for its technical services.

A rival country may even seek to reward those leaders and soldiers who have developed or grown their digital skills. The question is, if a rival country spent time educating its military and public sector using freely available materials and knowledge, would we see that time as wasted in comparison to our current military activities and time spent on drill or bureaucracy?

Digitally Transform the Defence Business

A rival would next focus on Digital Transformation across its Defence Business. Outside Defence, the business universe is expanding. Every day innovation accelerates, as technology blurs the boundaries between physical products and virtual experiences. Microsoft has helped people and businesses across the globe to digitally transform. Yet the Defence Business still restricts information. It is slow to adopt recent changes. It wastes money on systems that rapidly become obsolete yet has no new funding to replace them. The result is stagnation, not innovation. 

What if a rival military disrupted thinking by moving most of its business onto modern cloud platforms? Shifted its business culture to one of sharing information? Enabled decision makers to make and implement decisions quickly? That rival military would keep its core warfighting secrets very secret. Yet for everything else it would exploit secure and trusted systems for its routine business like management, project delivery and logistics.

The same as every other business on the planet, we must move wholeheartedly away from the “we’re different” to “what can we learn” mind-set that improves delivery of essential capabilities, offers better solutions and, most importantly, saves money. 

Again, what if a military rival digitally transformed most of its business to one like any other business or public sector dealing with personal information and time critical data? Would we look as they turned into more military capability the immense savings in expenditure that they made and claim that we are better off in comparison?

Democratise Information to empower people who own information to use information 

Finally, with a new Digital Skills trained workforce exploiting Digital Transformation, what if that rival military then Democratised Information? Modern businesses have realised that the best people to use information are the people who create and own that information. Placing information into peoples’ hands does not hinder decision making but improves it, by sharing opinions and enabling people to act faster and clearer. The military regularly centralises and controls its information, escalating decisions upwards where the myriad of data sources creates confusion rather than clarity. Empowered people use their local information to avoid unnecessary escalation and prevent information blockages.

What if that same rival military started to trust its people to access and use the information at its fingertips? Local commanders could see their energy use in barracks and act with their people. They could exploit the internet of things that is commercially available at a low price. They could identify opportunities to save money and raise those ideas quickly with supporting evidence. They could identify trends in retention, drawing on information to respond to concerns before people leave the service. Would we see such democratised information making a difference across a rival’s business as a missed opportunity?

We need these initiatives in the core of our defence business.

Military operations may still demand modified solutions to deliver information advantage in battle, yet it is futile expenditure without our core defence business adopting a digital transformation across its entirety. A rival military could easily and quickly introduce the three suggestions made here to gain information advantage over the UK. Yet so could we.

We could train our entire workforce in Digital Skills. We could Digitally Transform our way of doing business. We could quickly Democratise Information. The outcome would be revolutionary. 

Tic Toc Defence, Time for Information to Take the Lead

Christopher Nolan's Dunkirk, a film built on the concept of time, the necessity to understand goals, and meet them within controlled costs

Wired Magazine recently published an article by General Richard Barrons on the need to share ideas on information warfare between Government and Industry, but is better sharing really the answer? Why are we still struggling in this area, when the alarm clock has been ringing so loudly for so long?

Time, Information, Cost. Tic, Tic, Tic....

General Richard Barrons has passionately expressed his vision and fears about the future of conflict in his Warfare in the Information Age note (the WITIA note from December 2014) and now in Wired Magazine (link below if you are one of the few yet to read it).

Increased sharing of ideas around information warfare to protect the UK and its interests is needed, and UK Defence has been articulating its aspiration ever since WITIA was published. Doctrine and strategies are being developed, but right now we need clear focus to make that aspiration become reality. Time is ticking.

Industry and academia riding as the saviour of UK Defence is not going to address this challenge. It is a collective task, but there is not collective agreement. Some see that things must change, whilst some don't grasp why they should disrupt the norm of platforms having primacy. It seems for some that long procurement times, large platforms and incremental cost creep are almost the natural order of defence. We are united on the need to change, but not the nature of that change.

We can however recognise three big challenges:

1. We want technology now, but accept procurement and adoption processes that deliver over many years. How do we reduce time to deliver?

2. We want information advantage and manoeuvre, but accept information as an enabler rather than the lifeblood of Operations. How do we put information first?

3. We want to fully exploit information capabilities, but accept savings on networks and capacity that restrict that exploitation. How do we spend wisely?

We need not to adapt our thinking, but radically disrupt it. Tic. Tic. Tic...

Time needs to be targeted, and increased tempo introduced for acquiring and introducing capabilities. We can set two-year goals with agile delivery approaches rather than over estimated, optimistic life-cycles that anticipate delay. Focus on what must be achieved in two years, and ruthlessly drive towards that goal. We need to abandon the processes of delay, and introduce quicker, simpler ways for approval, acquisition and acceptance.

Information is the new blood of the battlefield, and it needs to be valued, understood, and placed at the heart of all operations and acquisitions. Information must come first. All programmes should explain how they contribute and exploit the information domain, far beyond just the appointment of a lead for an information line of development. All programmes should explain their information needs to provide maximum rather than minimal capability. We need to put Information Programmes above traditional capabilities to enable us to catch up, match and defeat our adversaries.

Costs need to be controlled and brought into perspective, based on this new emphasis on information first. Spending hundred million on single items yet only thousands on their information systems needed to exploit those platforms is not economical, proportionate or efficient. Information is so vital to success that we cannot scrimp on its provision. On the other, it offers significantly greater returns on investment, penny by penny, when compared to traditional defence expenditure and this opportunity must be seized.

Time, Information, Costs.

UK Defence has shown that it can improve in parts when delivering faster systems; or exploiting information; or controlling costs. For information age warfare, this must be done as a whole rather than in parts and we need to focus on how to unite these ideas. Without focus we will continue to aspire high and reach low.

Let's start to share ideas around Time, Information, Cost. The clock is ticking and the alarm starting to ring.

We can set two-year goals with agile delivery.

Information must come first.

Information is so vital to success that we cannot scrimp on its provision.